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PILOT JUDGMENT: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN EVALUATION AND TRAINING AND
FUTURE ISSUES IN AVIATION CASES
MICHAEL

J. PANGIA*

R EVIEW OF probable cause determinations of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reveals that a
vast number of aviation accidents result from errors or failures in the exercise of pilot judgment.1 The exercise of good
pilot judgment is neither taught nor evaluated in any primary
flight training curriculum presently used. This article emphasizes the need to probe deeper into the judgment process in
order to learn how to reduce recurrences of these accidents
through different approaches in training techniques. It also
presents a brief account of the development in this area and
predicts possible future effects in the development of aviation
law.
At 8:08 a.m. on March 6, 1971, a dental surgeon with a pri* Michael J. Pangia practices law in Washington, D.C. He holds an engineering
degree and a commercial pilot certificate for aircraft and glider. He is instrument and
multi-engine rated and is a certified flight and ground school instructor. Mr. Pangia
was formerly the Chief of the Litigation Division of Federal Aviation Administration
and assistant director in charge of Aviation Litigation at the U.S. Department of
Justice.
' Determination of probable causes of aircraft accidents and related factors by the
NTSB are contained in a narrative report or in a computer format as stated in 49
C.F.R. § 835.2 (1981). The NTSB also prepares periodic reviews of data derived from
these determinations. For example, NTSB REPORT No. ARG-81-1, ANNUAL REVIEW OF
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA FOR U.S. GENERAL AVIATION 13-16 (Nov. 5, 1981), points out
that of 678 fatal accidents in 1979, 84.37% were "pilot" caused, a decrease of only
3.55% over a five year average. Of the total fatal accidents in 1979, 40.71% of them
were due to weather related causes and factors, an increase in .21% over a five year
average.
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vate pilot certificate and an instrument rating took-off in a
six-place Beechcraft Bonanza aircraft bound for Harrison, Arkansas, seventy miles away.' Prior to the flight, the surgeonpilot visited the Flight Service Station (FSS) where he was
informed of a close temperature and dewpoint, 36 and 35 degrees respectively, with light rain and fog.' The pilot was also
told that an area forecast indicated the passage of a cold front
with some icing conditions and that a pilot who had taken off
approximately a half an hour before had reported picking up
ice below 7,000 feet.' Although the surgeon-pilot originally
filed a flight plan that indicated a cruising altitude of 5,000
feet, when he heard of the icing report, he changed it to 7,000
feet. The FSS personnel commented that it was "probably
better at seven," to which the pilot responded "no, change it
back to five."
At the urging of the FSS personnel, the pilot sat in the aircraft until the 8:00 a.m. hourly weather report for his destination airport was available.' That report contained the same
close temperature and dewpoint, light rain, low ceilings, and a
notation, "PRESRR" (pressure rising rapidly), which indicated that the cold front was at the destination airport. Such
conditions are dangerous because of, among other possibilities, the formation of structural ice, particularly clear ice." After take-off, the pilot complained of icing, but the air traffic
controllers were unable to do anything except respond to his
" The details of this account are contained in Deal v. United States, 413 F. Supp.
630 (W.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 255 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977)
(tried for the United States by this author), and in NTSB ACCIDENT REP. No. FTW71-A-F057 (March 12, 1971).
" A spread of 4 degrees Fahrenheit or less between the temperature and dewpoint
indicates the likelihood of the existence of fog, precipitation, or other visibility obscuring phenomena. See generally FAA ADVISORY CIE. 61-23B, at 118 (1980).
4

413 F. Supp. at 634.

8Id.

Clear ice occurs when large supercooled droplets of water in sub-freezing ambient
temperatures refrigerate on the aircraft surface. In a cold front, cooler air moves in
and replaces relatively warm air by plowing under it. Near the transition of the two
air masses, an aircraft approaching from the cold side may encounter rain falling
from the warmer side which literally refrigerates on its surfaces. Depending upon the
temperature and the size of the water droplets, the accumulation of clear ice can be
alarmingly rapid. See FAA ADVISORY CiR. No. 00-6A, at 99-101 (1975).
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request for changes of altitude.' The pilot arrived at his destination, but while turning onto the final approach course, he
apparently became preoccupied with maintaining visual contact with the runway and banked the aircraft too steeply at
too low an airspeed, stalled, and crashed just short of the runway. 8 One-half to three-quarters of an inch of clear ice was
found on the airframe and inbroken sheets under the wreckage. The pilot and his passengers died in the crash.'
Several months after the accident, the NTSB determined
that the probable causes of the accident related to the pilotin-command who, among other things, made "improper inflight decisions or planning" and "failed to obtain/maintain
flying speed," which is essentially pilot error with an "incorrect weather forecast" as a factor.' 0 In a report prepared by
the Flight Safety Foundation (Foundation),11 the accident was
classified as being caused by "too much weather.

12

The

Foundation recommended "upgrading the FAA Flight Service
Stations" to provide better information to the pilot.'3 The estate of the pilot and the families of the passengers sued the
United States for alleged negligent air traffic control service in
Deal v. United States.' The court found the sole proximate
cause of the accident to be pilot error.' 5 The pilot simply exercised poor judgment.
A review of statistics reveals that accidents involving poor
413 F. Supp. at 635. Air Traffic Controller's duties are set forth in U.S. DEPARTMENT OP TRANSPORTATION, AIR TRAFFic CONTROL 7110.65 (1982). See Swanson v.
United States, 435 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y 1977), which also addresses the limitations

of the controllers' duties regarding aircraft encountering ice.
413 F. Supp. at 635-36.

Ild. at 636.
,0NTSB Brief of Accident Occuring at Harrison, Ark., 3-6-71.
" The Flight Safety Foundation is a New York non-profit corporation consisting of
individuals and corporations contributing for the purpose of sharing flight safety
information.
11 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION,

SAFETY IN GENERAL AVIATION 83 (1971). See also

Collins, How to Put More Service in Flight Service Stations, FLYING MAGAZINE, April
1971, at 53.
13 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION, supra note 12, at 84.
" 413 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Ark. 1976), affd, 552 F.2d 255 (8th Cir.), cert denied,
434 U.S. 890 (1977).
11 413 F. Supp. at 639.
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judgment or human error are common. 16 The pilot in the Deal
case unquestionably committed human error in failing to
maintain sufficient airspeed during a steep bank. He further
committed pilot error with regard to the weather. While such
determinations may be sufficient in litigation to determine
financial responsibilities or in accident investigations to
gather statistics, these determinations rarely advance aviation
safety. From an accident prevention standpoint, to simply
place the cause of the Deal accident into the amorphous category of human error followed by the typical recommendations
to provide more or different information to pilots ignores what
really happened on that dismal day in Arkansas. Such a superficial explanation does little to reduce future pilot error.
The current approach of merely teaching aerodynamics, meteorology, and navigational concepts to pilots appears largely
ineffective in reducing accidents. Certainly, government and
private aviation publications are replete with advice and
warnings to pilots about proper airspeed, weather, fuel requirements, the use of charts, and nearly every aspect of flight
safety. 17 Nevertheless, a comparision of NTSB annual reports
indicates an undiminishing percentage of accidents occurring
from the exercise of poor judgment on the part of pilots.' 8 For
example, a recent NTSB release observed that some pilots
"continue to show a recurring violation of a basic rule of
flight-failure to maintain flying speed."' 9 In that release, the
NTSB cited as a typical profile, a pilot making a steep bank
at a low altitude.2 0 Further, the NTSB stated that "[t]o preSee supra note 1 and accompanying text.
,7 FAA ADVISORY CIR. No. 61-23B (1980) also contains such information. Many
other publications of this nature exist, but are too numerous for specific mention.
,' See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also Lucaccini, Situational Emergency Training Experiences and Implications (1982) (proceedings of the SAE Aerospace Congress & Exposition, Anaheim, California, Oct. 25-28, 1982). Lucaccini notes
that the NTSB 1977 review of data showed not only that the "pilot" was the factor in
81% of the total civilian accidents for that year, but also that the trend of pilot error
in the military has not significantly changed over the past decade. Id.
1, NTSB RELEASE No. SB81-72/3290 (Aug. 31, 1981).
,0 Id. A bank increases the speed at which an aircraft will stall. If a pilot banks too
steeply while turning onto the final approach course for a landing, the aircraft may
stall and spin at an altitude which affords no room for a safe recovery. FAA ADVISORY
CIR. No. 61-23B, at 24-27 (1980).
IC
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vent this type of accident," pilots must keep in mind the need
to maintain sufficient airspeed no matter what the distraction.' The release demonstrates that statistics do not show a
decrease in the prevention of pilot-error accidents as a result
of these repeated warnings. Obviously, until the cause of poor
judgment is discovered and analyzed in terms of increasing
self-awareness, the percentage of accidents attributable to
human error will remain high."
Basically the pilot in the Deal case exercised poor judgment, a common manifestation of human error leading to fatal
decisions. By trying the cases like Deal, particularly from the
damages aspect, an attorney can learn the pilot's background,
habits, family life, mental health, and many other factors that
have a bearing on the pilot's judgment process. While an indepth analysis of the psychological reasons for the exercise of
poor judgment is generally unnecessary for the determination
of accident cause in the legal sense, ignoring evidence that
may lead the way to more insight into the manner in which
poor judgments are made, would only perpetuate the tragedy
of these accidents. One lesson to be learned from Deal is the
recognition that to reduce the recurrence of these accidents,
an answer must be found to the fundamental but often ignored question which has been appropriately termed, "the
real why" of the human error accident.28 This question must
be answered in order to understand why pilots make good and
NTSB RELES No. SB81-72/3290 (Aug. 31, 1981).
Peelle, Psychological Factors Relating to Safety Training: Content and Methodology, 11 SAFE J. 12 (1981), appropriately states that:
It appears that human factors are some of the more significant ones,
and, in fact, the critical common denominators in a variety of accidents. Yet, approaches to improving safety have not typically addressed these factors. The focus, instead, has usually been on things
such as technical information, equipment, manuals or procedures
which, unfortunately, do not necessarily fit all contingencies. These
approaches have not reduced problems of safety.
Peelle further notes that "[w]e lack, in short, understanding of the microstructure of
human behavior in the aviation environment, and thus an understanding of the
causes of human errors in that environment." Id. at 12.
" See J. Stoklosa, Human Performance Factors in Aviation Accidents: An Investigator's Methodology (Oct. 29, 1981) (paper presented at the International Society of
Air Safety Investigators, Washington, D.C.).
22
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bad judgments.
Judgment has been defined as "the forming of an opinion
... as from circumstances presented to the mind '24 or "capacity to make reasonable decisions... "25 The outcome of judgment is the decision to act based upon events commanding
the decision rather than a reaction to those events. Pilot judgment has been defined recently as "the mental process by
which the pilot recognizes, analyzes, and evaluates information regarding himself, the aircraft, and the outside environment" and that "[t]he final step in the process is the making
of a decision pertaining to the operation of the aircraft."26
The study of pilot judgment is embodied within the broad
subject of aviation psychology, recently defined as "the science of human behavior in the operation of aviation systems.

' 27

Aviation psychology examines pilot performance in a

broad sense. For example, it recognizes that accidents result
when the machine, in this case the aircraft, fails to interface
with the normal physiological, sensory, and perceptual limitations of the human being-the so-called "induced pilot error"
accident.2 8 Similarly, human errors can occur in emergency
situations because of inappropriate responses due to stress.29
9 RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 724 (rev. ed. 1975).
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 709 (1969).
J. Berlin, Developing a Civil Aviation Pilot Judgment Training and Evaluation
Manual 3 (Oct. 1980) (Final Report prepared for the Federal Aviation Administration
Technical Center, Contract No. DOT-FA79WA-4328).
27 S. Rosco, AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY 3 (1980). Unfortunately, the term "psychology"
often conjures visions in the mind of the general public of a psychiatrist's couch. In
fact, Rosco states, "[w]hen someone asks me what I do and I say that I'm an aviation
psychologist, almost invariably they ask me if that means that I psychoanalyze pilots." Kearsley, Aviation Psychology, APA MONITOR, Aug./Sept. 1981, at 10. The
term as used herein in connection with aviation connotes a broad study of human
behavior, an important field that may be in search of a less threatening title.
28 See AIRCRAFT DESIGN INDUCED PILOT ERROR, NTSB RELEASE No. PB.175 629
(July 1967) (explaining that certain cockpit and instrument design features may tend
to increase the probability of a mistake).
" Lucaccini states that "[i]t would appear that aircraft emergencies are among the
ultimate stressors for flying personnel and that the element of threat of personal risk
is the critical factor that underlies the human operator's decision errors that are involved in some aircraft accidents." Lucaccini, supra note 18, at 4. Lucaccini further
notes that human behavior in response to extreme factors may be categorized by a
sharp increase in excitability expressed in impulsive acts, impairment and loss of
skills or by an inhibition and even the cessation of activity, and that both types of
"

26

1983]

PILOT JUDGMENT

An inappropriate reaction can be particularly acute if the pilot lacks experience in stressful situations. Pilots with
thousands of flying hours have made emergency landings because of engine failures, merely because the pilots had forgotten to switch from empty to full fuel tanks.3 0 This occurrence
may be an example of mental rigidity in the unusual situation
that may not be always corrected, and perhaps even aggravated, by extensive flying experience.3 1
Regarding the "induced pilot error" accident, cockpits must
be designed to accommodate expected habits, perceptions,
and reactions of the human being in order to minimize the
possibility of mistakes.3 2 Pertaining to emergency situations,
inbreeding proper responses has been done to some extent in
primary training and is being done with increasing frequency
in simulators.33 Nevertheless, most human error accidents
probably are caused by pilots who ordinarily are not the careless or reckless type. Interestingly, pilots that are responsible
and ordinarily careful persons who have had plenty of time to
select safe alternative courses of action still exercise poor
judgment. It is the judgment process itself that must be examined before evaluation in training techniques can be
adopted.
reactions result in a disorganization of rational activity on the part of the individual.
Id. at 4.
Hass, One Expert's Opinion, AIR PROGRESS, Feb. 1978, at 16, 78.
" Mental rigidity may be a manifestation of what one behavioral study has called
an "interruption" which overrides an ongoing sequence, drawing a person's behavior
or thoughts to some other locus. The more established the pattern, the greater may
be the stress caused by the unusual and unexpected situation. This technique is also
used in hypnosis. See generally I R. DILTS, J. GRINDER, R. BANDLER, L. BANDLER, & J.
DELOZIER, NEURO-LINGUISTIC PROGRAMMING: THE STUDY OF THE STRUCTURE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE 236-40 (1980).

11 See Aubauer & Sperr, Ergonomic Aspects in Cockpit Lay-Out, Diehl, General
Aviation Cockpit Design Features Related to Inadvertant Landing Gear Retraction
Accidents, & Rosoe, Human Factors and Aviation Safety, in First International

Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Tech Rep. No. APL-1-81 (April 21-22, 1981)
(sponsored by NASA Ames Research Center and the Association of American Psychologists, Battelle, Columbus Laboratories; held at Ohio State University).

" An interesting approach to the problem of panic situations is taken by the Air
Force in its F-15 training. See AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND, REPORT No. AFHRL-

TR-76-47(1),
Texas).

SITUATIONAL EMERGENCY TRAINING

(June 1976) (Brooks Air Force Base,
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Fundamentally, the seemingly traditional supposition that
judgment neither can be tested nor taught must be discarded
to allow exploration of new approaches to modify positively

the exercise of judgment. The cliche which probably every pilot has heard at one time or another, that "you either have it
or you don't,"" not only ignores the advances which have
been made in obtaining positive behavorial modification in
many areas of human endeavor ranging from child psychology
to personnel management, sales training, negotiating and even
in many legal fields, but also bespeaks of an attitude which
inhibits progress in a very important area of accident prevention. 5 The aviation population can no longer afford to consider itself impervious to education and positive change in the
exercise of judgment.36 Fortunately, significant advances in
this area are now appearing.

The concern about pilot judgment and judgment modification began during World War I when a psychologist, Robert
Yerkes, undertook the development of tests to weed out undesirable pilot candidates.3 7 In World War II, the Army-Air
Force established an aviation psychology program which initially focused on pilot selection and classification, but the program soon expanded to encompass other areas such as pilot
training and performance.3 8 In 1947, both the Civil AeronauBrecke, InstructionalDesign for Aircrew Judgment Training, in
OF THE SECOND

INTERSTATE/INDUSTRY

PROCEEDINGS
TRAINING EQUIPMENT CONFERENCE 189 (Salt

Lake City, Utah, Nov. 18-10, 1980), notes this somewhat established idea, wittily citing Thomas Wolfe in THE RIGHT STUFF (1979).
"5 See, e.g., A. ZELLER, USAF MULTIMEDIA TRAFFIC TRAINING PROGRAM (Oct. 11,
1973), (presented at the First International Conference on Driver Behavior, Zurich,
Switzerland) wherein empirical validation is noted for accident rate reduction as a
result of driver judgment and behavioral training by the United States Air Force.
s Peelle, supra note 22, at 12, states that:
Safety research and programs are being conducted in a variety of settings, but little cross-sharing of information has occurred. While the
need for an approach to safety which deals with human factors is common to all industries, it is particularly important to the aviation industry because of the impact of flight crew behavior on large numbers of
people. Approaches utilized by production-oriented industries may be
applicable to aviation.
Id.
"' Kearsley, supra note 27, at 10.
38 Id. The War Time Programs gave rise to a number of psychologists, the most
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tics Board and the Department of Commerce advocated that
psychological testing developed by the military during World
War II should determine the fitness of commercial pilots, but
no plan was adopted."0 This author's opinion is that the state
of the art has not advanced sufficiently to provide an objective
judgment testing program to eliminate applicants. At the current time, however, the knowledge necessary to educate and to
train pilots to develop a greater self-awareness in judgmentmaking is available and must be used to reduce accidents. "
To effectively explore the judgment process it is necessary,
as a leading psychologist states, "[t]o find the correlates of the
factors which do not depend upon specific training or experience-in other words, the culture-free characteristics of people that lead to good judgment." Further, educating pilots as
to how their minds work in the selection and assessment of
the information that goes into making judgments is necessary
so that pilots can positively modify the process and more objectively control their decisions.4 ' This education is basically a
specialized study in self-awareness, the need for which has
been long recognized but apparently little satisfied.
The first broad based attempt to study judgment training
notable of which was Paul Fits, who concentrated primarily on the human aspects of
systems engineering-the capabilities and limitations of humans to interface with
mechanical controls and instruments.
" Lee, Air Safety, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP., Vol. I, No. 8, at 163 (1947).
40 Interestingly, the Airline War Training Institute in 1943 instructed crews in the
following manner:
Gnothi Seauton. These two words represent the foundation of
philiosophy. If they are Greek to you, that's all right because they are
the words of the ancient Greek philosopher, Socrates. They mean
"Know Thyself", your abilities, personality, and character.
This philosophy is extremely important to flight crews who must know
themselves, particularly their limitations, in order to act efficiently, behave properly and work as a team to fly safely. Do you know yourself ?
AIRLINE WAR TRAINING INSTITUTE, ATTITUDE 3 (1943). See also D. BEATY, THE HUMAN
FACTOR IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS 10 (1969), noting that "[p]sychologists have only just
started to be interested in decision theory, and considering effective decision-making

is a biological, sociological and economic need for our survival. There is little evidence
that students in our schools and universities are adequately instructed in evaluative
abilities."
Kearsley, supra, note 27, at 11 (quoting aviation psychologist Stanley Roscoe).
" "A pilot's mind is the soul of any flight ..... " Brechner, A Question of Judgment, FLYING MAGAZINE, May 1981, at 48.
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did not occur until 1977 under a program sponsored by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) entitled, JUDGMENT
EVALUATION AND INSTRUCTION IN CIVIL PILOT TRAINING,

under-

taken by R. Jensen and R. Benel." This study attempted to
define judgment and explore whether it can be evaluated and
taught. It noted that every decision that a pilot makes is influenced by physiological and social pressures that are virtually
impossible to measure at the time a pilot's decision is made."
In addition, a person's self-image and the need to maintain an
external image largely determine how a pilot's values will affect his judgment process. The study concluded that judgment
can be evaluated and taught and defined in two component
parts as follows:
(1) The ability to search for and establish the relevance of all
available information regarding a situation, to specify the alternative courses of action, and to determine expected outcomes
from each alternative.
(2) The motivation to choose and authoritatively execute a
suitable course of action within the time frame permitted by
the situation."5
The JENSEN AND BENEL STUDY further notes an existing suggestion that because of the nature of the subject matter to be
taught, attitudes, principles, and motivations, the flight instructors should bear the primary load of judgment training.4 6
Interestingly, the FAA seems to have recognized the feasibility of teaching judgment, at least on the flight instructor level,
indicated by the publication of a circular entitled the Flight
Instructor's Handbook.47 This handbook attempts to teach
the flight instructor the fundamentals of human behavior and
also stresses the importance of imparting positive attitudes
13 R. JENSEN

& R.

BENEL, JUDGMENT EVALUATION AND INSTRUCTION IN CIVIL TRAIN-

(1982) (Aviation Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, Rep. No. FAA-RD78-24) [hereinafter cited as JENSEN & BENEL STUDY]
" Id. at 8
4I Id.
41 Id.
at 55.
ING

47

See FAA

ADVISORY CIR.

No. 61-16A (rev. 1969), which has been superseded by

FAA ADVISORY CIR. No. 60-14, Aviation Instructor's Handbook (1977) [hereinafter
cited as FAA HANDBOOK].
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and motivations while instructing. 48 However, there is no
identifiable curriculum or study material from which the student pilot can learn directly about the judgment process.4 '
Apparently, efforts in this regard are now being made.
The latest and perhaps first valid attempt to design a judgment evaluation and teaching method in primary pilot training is a program undertaken at the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and sponsored by the FAA, entitled
DEVELOPING A CIVIL AVIATION PILOT JUDGMENT TRAINING AND

EVALUATION MANUAL. 5" The summary of this effort now appears in three volumes entitled, PILOT JUDGMENT TRAINING
AND EVALUATION. 51

Volume I contains a technical summary of
the findings regarding the judgment process of pilots verified
by observations and experimentation of various training techniques. Volume II is a Student Manual which attempts to explain directly to the student the processes of good and bad
judgment and contains a test by which a student can identify
his or her particular judgment traits. Volume III is an Instructor's Manual which is designed to redirect a pilot's thinking in
order to promote the consistent ,use of good judgment. While
these manuals are being still evaluated, they represent a major step forward to positively modify the judgment process of
pilots, and reduce the occurrence of accidents caused by poor
pilot judgment. They also contain some very interesting
observations.
The EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY recognizes that most accidents
result from a combination of untoward circumstances, rather
than a single cause such as pilot error, aircraft defect, or envi48
49

FAA

HANDBOOK, supra note 47, at i.
A pilot education program, entitled Command/Leadership/Resource Manage-

ment, available through United Airlines, Inc., is designed to make pilots self-aware of
some of their behavioral traits, particularly in cockpit management. However, there is
no such program available for primary students.
50 J. BERLIN, DEVELOPING A CIVIL AVIATION PILOT JUDGMENT TRAINING AND EvALUATION MANUAL

(Oct. 1980) (Final Report to the F.A.A. Technical Center, Contract No.

DOT-FA79WA-4328).
6J J. BERLIN, PILOT JUDGMENT TRAINING AND EVALUATION (1980) (Embry-Riddle

Aeronautical University, DOT/FAA/CT-82/56) (available through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia) [hereinafter cited as EMBRY-RIDDLE
STUDY].
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ronmental stress, and that an aircraft accident is the end result of a causal chain of these circumstances.5 2 The EMBRYRIDDLE STUDY states that in a similar manner, most accidents
do not result from one error in judgment, but from a series of
errors pertaining to pilot proficiency and experience, aircraft
condition, or stress caused by the outside environment forming a "poor judgment chain," the principles of which follow:
1. One poor judgment increases the probability that another
poor judgment will follow.
2. The more poor judgments made in sequence, the more probable that others will follow.
3. As the chain of poor judgment grows, the alternatives for
safe flight decrease.
4. The longer the pilot judgment chain becomes the more probable that an accident will occur.58
The EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY further stresses that if a pilot
does not take the most important first step in breaking the
chain, which is a recognition by the pilot that he or she has
made a poor judgment, there is little chance to prevent subsequent recurrences of poor judgments.5 4 That recognition requires a self-evaluation and provision of corrective information about his or her judgment process-a feedback system.
As further noted, "good judgment is a learned process" and
with appropriate training, a pilot will learn to obtain feedback
from his or her own senses.8 5 To break the poor judgment
chain as early as possible, the pilot must (1) recognize that a
poor judgment has been made; (2) check for personal stress
that could allow the chain to continue; (3) correct the problem
that resulted from poor judgment; (4) search for other poor
judgments; and, (5) diagnose the original poor judgment to
provide oneself the feedback to avoid making a similar poor
judgment in the future. 6
The EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY further recognizes the necessity
EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY,

'

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

'
"
'

supra note 51, at 6.
6-7.
7.
3.
7-8. (emphasis supplied).

'

at
at
at
at
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of identifying specific thought patterns that would make a pilot willing to violate regulations, extend safety margins, exceed legal limitations, or attempt to operate an aircraft in
conditions beyond his or her capabilities, or what the JENSON
& BENEL STUDY labels as "irrational pilot judgment. ' '57 The
JENSON & BENEL STUDY postulated that if these thought patterns could be indentified, then pilots could be trained to recognize them in their own thinking and apply corrective actions. In consultations with experts in psychological and social
sciences, the EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY identified the following
58
hazardous thought patterns:
1. Anti-authority-a thought pattern found in people who resent the control of their actions by any outside authority.
These people will tend to ignore advice even though wellfounded.
2. Impulsivity-a thought pattern found in people who, when
facing a moment of decision, feel that they must do something
and do it quickly. They tend to react to the first thing that
comes to mind without examining alternatives.
3. Invulnerability-a thought pattern exhibited by people who
feel that nothing disastrous will happen to them. These people
are more likely to take chances and unwise risks, feeling that
accidents will happen to other people, but not to them.
4. Macho-a thought pattern exhibited by people who are always trying to prove that they are better than others. A person
with this thought pattern generally exhibits overconfidence
and attempts to accomplish too difficult things in order to
prove himself or herself and gain the admiration of others.
This characteristic, of course, is not restricted to males.59
"

Id. at 10;

JENSEN & BENEL STUDY,
EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY, supra note

supra note 43, at 3-4.
51, at 9-10.

69In fact, one collection of pilots' personality profiles indicated a significantly

higher degree of achievement, exhibition, dominance, change, and heterosexuality in
females than in comparison to their average male counterparts. The average profile is
characterized by what popularly is conceived as the adventurous, romantic, "he-man"
figure-definitely a pilot who projects self-confidence. The average profile of the fe-

male pilot is characterized by the same factors as the male profile. In other words, it
was found that female pilots have more personality traits in common with male pilots
than they have with women in the United States' population at large. Novello &
Zakhour, Psycho-social Studies in GeneralAviation ()-Personality Profile of Male
Pilots, 45 AEROSPACE MEDICINE 185 (1974); Novello & Youssef, Psycho-Social Studies
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5. External control-a thought pattern exhibited by people
who feel that they can do very little, if anything, to control
what happens to them in life. They often exhibit this belief
pattern by blaming others or outside events for what happens
to them and tend to leave decision-making responsibility to
others.
In addition to the self-awareness of the presence of hazardous
thinking, the EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY emphasizes a pilot's need
to be taught to take corrective actions against hazardous
thought patterns. Some promising training materials are proposed to teach students to remove the effect of hazardous
thought patterns by substituting it with a good judment
thought pattern. The substitution follows the tenet of behavior modification that a change of thoughts will promote a
change in actions. 0 Hopefully, the FAA will apply this work
by introducing these concepts into its primary training
requirements.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), along
with determining probable causes of accidents, formulates
safety recommendations in an attempt to reduce the recurrence of accidents." The NTSB recognizes the need to examine a pilot's judgment process in accident investigations in
order to reduce the accident rate.2 However, the NTSB's apin General Aviation (H)-Personality Profile of Female Pilots, 45 AEROSPACE
MEDICINE 630 (1974).

"

EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY, supra note 51, at 10-11.
1 49 U.S.C. § 1903 (1976).
62 See A. DIEHL, FORMALIZING A HUMAN PERFORMANCE PROGRAM (1980), wherein
the author recognizes that:
By investigating only for "probable cause," the tendency is to examine
the wreckage for evidence of mechanical problems. When none are
found, the investigator concludes that the crew was at fault, and some
type of generic label is invoked such as "failed to see and avoid," "improper use of controls," "failed to arrest descent at the decision
height."
Unfortunately, all too often precious little effort is made to ascertain
why the pilot "erred." And only in rare cases is any attempt made to
identify, analyze and understand any of the underlying system
problems which may have led to the accident.
Id. at 2. Diehl further notes that because many aviation investigations performed by
the FAA and the NTSB field offices stop at simple "pilot error" determinations, they
typically have only minimal impact in preventing future accidents. Id. at 2-3.
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proach on this subject of accident investigations has been sporadic and uncertain.
The NTSB finally acted on its recognition of the need to
probe more deeply into the psychophysiological aspects of
judgment errors in 1979. That year, the NTSB investigated
the Downeast Airlines accident in Rockland, Maine, which occured on May 30th 1979. The NTSB report which was released in 1980 was probably the first public report containing
investigations of a crew's physiological and psychological conditions just prior to an accident." Interviews with former
company pilots, friends, and relatives indicated that the captain, who was not an assertive person, was subject to constant
company pressure. Interviews also revealed high pilot turnover in the company. For the captain the stress manifested itself by a loss of appetite, exhaustion, preoccupation, chest
pains, and breathing difficulties. The NTSB noted that this
level of stress over an extended period of time could result in
depression and contribute to a chronic state of fatigue.'
In the Downeast Airlines report, the NTSB referred to several British studies on human performance and fatigue."
These studies demonstrate that as individuals become more
fatigued they become increasingly willing to accept lower
standards of accuracy and performance. The studies note that
fatigued pilots fail to integrate data from flight instruments.
Instead, the pilots focus their responses upon a singular instrument, or group of instruments, often neglecting fundamental control actuation. Interestingly, the British studies
document an increase in the number of errors at the end of
the flight. The errors were caused by a performance deterioration which occurs as a result of relaxation and anticipation of
The NTSB also recognizes the need for a different approach in training. In 1977,
the chairman of the NTSB pointed out that in the civilian pilot training environment
as it existed, there was "no attempt to get at judgment." He criticized the existing
teaching methodology, appropriately noting that "[y]ou don't teach people judgment
by teaching them to jump through hoops." AVIATION CONSUMER, March 1, 1977, at 15.

NTSB REPORT No. AAR-80-5 (Downeast Airlines, Inc. De Havilland DHC-6-200,
N68DE, Rockland, Maine, May 30, 1979) (The author of the present article was the
FAA spokesman for the accident investigation hearings involving this accident).
" Id. at 23.
66 Id. at 24.
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flights' end." While the NTSB made no recommendations in
the Downeast Airlines accident report regarding the need to
study the judgment process, the NTSB's recognition of the
factual analysis found in the British studies perhaps indicates
the NTSB's awareness of the importance of learning about
the process of fatigue, mental pressures and other psychological factors insidiously affecting pilot judgment and
performance. 67

It was not until 1981 at a hearing concerning the Cascade
Airways Beechcraft 99 crash in Spokane, Washington, on January 20, 1981, that the NTSB included a human factors expert on its panel of experts investigating the accident." Although much of the questioning by the NTSB human factors
expert at the public hearing dealt with cockpit communication
capability in high noise environment and the cognitive and
sensory limitations of a pilot interacting with certain instruments, the investigation did include a flight crew behavioral
profile describing the general personality characteristics of the
crew.9 The investigation also included an analysis of the
crew's operational behavior.7 0 As in the Downeast accident,
the NTSB made no specfic recommendation in the Cascade
Airways accident report about the need for attitude and judgment training. Nevertheless, the NTSB probe is at least another indication of the need to understand the pilot judgment
process in order to accomplish effective accident investigation
and prevention.
Although the need to probe the cause of pilot error has been
recognized, considerable restraints attend efforts to develop
individual pilot profiles and behavioral characteristics after an
accident. One restraint results from perhaps an understandable respect of privacy and reluctance of friends and relatives
Id.
A. DIEHL, supra note 62, at 2, 3, illustrates how varying emphasis on human
performance could have produced quite different conclusions from an investigation of
a typical accident such as the Downeast accident.
" NTSB ACCIDENT REP. No. AAR-81-11 (July 21, 1981) (this author was the FAA
spokesman for the accident investigation hearings involving this accident).
' Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 17-18.
67

19831

PILOT JUDGMENT

to divulge personal matters relating to the pilot. An investigator's lack of training, skill, and experience may also hinder the
quality of such discovery efforts. As an example, in the report
of the accident of the Air Florida 737 at Washington, D.C., on
January 13, 1982, the NTSB found that the crew made poor
judgments in taking off with snow and ice adhesion on the
71
wings and without using the engine anti-ice systems.
Regarding Air Florida crew experience and training, the
NTSB recognized that by the time a person qualifies as a captain, he should be capable of detecting all of the situations
encountered in the events which led up to the Air Florida accident. Nevertheless, the captain did not react to the first officer's repeated comments that something was wrong on the
takeoff roll or to evidence of pre-stall warnings after liftoff.
The NTSB suggested that the first officer's comments were
not sufficiently assertive, but the in-depth reasons for the
crew's departure from basic experience and training were not
unexplored. The NTSB simply expressed a belief that the
training program should include considerations of command
decision, resource management, role performance and
72
assertiveness.
In light of developments in aviation psychology relating to
pilot judgement, an in-depth analysis of behavioral traits and
hazardous thought patterns would be far more helpful in finding ways of improving judgment than merely repeating suggestions of more or different training. The NTSB refrained
from doing an in-depth analysis to determine what motivating
psychological factors may have affected judgment in the Air
Florida accident. It appeared that investigatory efforts in this
7
NTSB ACCIDENT REP. No. AAR-82-8, at 2 (August 10, 1982). The NTSB also
found that the power levels were not adanced to full thrust prior to impact because
of the belief that the crew was concerned about exceeding engine thrust limitations
due to their training. Id. at 66. NTSB regulations prohibit the take-off of an aircraft
when frost, snow, or ice is adhering to the wings, control surfaces, or propellers of the
aircraft. 14 C.F.R. § 121.629 (1982). Engine anti-ice prevents icing of the engine inlet
pressure sensor which detects engine inlet pressure and, by comparing it to engine
outlet pressure, gives a reading on the exhaust pressure ratio gauge indicating to the
crew the amount of power the engine is generating. Ice blockage of the inlet probe
results in a reading of more power than the engine is actually delivering.
71 NSTB ACCIDENT REP. No. AAR-82-8, at 66-68 (August 10, 1982).
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regard were thwarted by the industry and by disagreements
within the NTSB itself." A probative analysis need not necessarily involve unwarranted invasions into the private lives of a
crew because sufficient indicia of poor judgment traits and
hazardous thought patterns may be found from training
records, basic profiles and a psychological analysis of the information gathered by the cockpit voice recorder.' We simply
cannot continue to avoid "the real why" of these poor judgment accidents. The NTSB and the aviation industry must do
more to investigate methodology in line with current developments in the study of judgment, self-awareness and behavioral
modification to help prevent this type of accident.
As previously discussed, responsible entities, such as the
FAA, NTSB, and segments of the aviation industry, not only
recognize the need for more fully defining the real cause of
poor judgment accidents, but these entities also recognize the
feasibility and the benefits of educating pilots in positive
judgment and behavorial modification. Whether the challenge
to formally educate pilots will be met by efforts to integrate
this increasing information into meaninful training processes
remains to be seen. In any event, if attorneys and experts
probe more deeply into the underlying causes of pilot error in
aviation investigation and litigation, corresponding duties and
increased standards of care will similarly develop.
In the law of tort, the concept of due care presupposes some
uniform standard of behavior set by the demands of the community-the expectations of the reasonable person. In the
73 This is the author's personal observation gathered while representing the FAA as
spokesman in the Air Florida investigation and related NTSB accident hearing. In a
recent effort to investigate human performance factors, the NTSB has revamped an

old investigation report form to include more personal information about the pilots.
However, it is still devoid of a search for data which would reveal pilot judgment and

behavioral traits to a significant degree.
71 As an example, while taxiing toward the runway the first officer commented"..
its impressive that these big old planes get in here with the weather this bad you

know, it's impressive" and [i]t never ceases to amaze me when we break out of the
clouds, there's the runway, I don't care how many times we do it." NTSB ACCIDENT
REP. No. AAR-82-8, at 114-15 (August 10, 1982). These comments may be an example
of a hazardous thought pattern such as invulnerability or an example of the effect of

previously successful outcomes on future judgments. Such an analysis may help
others to identify and correct such possible judgment traits in themselves.
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ideal sense, the standard must be an external and objective
one rather than one of the individual judgment, good or bad,
of the actor."8 The law declares that objective standards dictate how the reasonable person will behave under a given set
of circumstances. 7 6' As Mr. Justice Holmes states, "[tihe law
takes no account of the internal character of a given act so
different in different men. It does not attempt to see men as
God sees them, for more than one sufficient reason.

' 77

The

social judgments of the community, however, actually set the
standard of resonableness. These community judgments are
all but objective and permanent.
The community recognizes that the reasonable person must
be expected to act differently from situation to situation and
in accordance with his or her physical and intellectual capabilities-indeed subjective standards. For example, society expects a reasonably prudent airline pilot to be more capable
than a novice. Likewise, factors such as mental capacity, dispostion, age and specialized knowledge have resulted in a different case outcomes. Thus, mental capacity and disposition
can be relevant factors in an action for punitive damages, in
which a defendant's intention may be relevant. In other cases,
because of the plaintiff's knowledge and capability, the plaintiff may have a duty to take advantage of a last clear chance
to avoid an accident despite the negligence of the defendant.
The standard of care, therefore, in the true sense involves the
study of human behavioral traits and modifications.
As knowledge of human behavior has increased, the elements of due care have changed. For example, in aviation tort
law the standard of care changed from one of absolute liability, which regarded the piloting of an aircraft as an ultrahazardous activity akin to harboring a wild animal, to a
recognition that perhaps an aeronaut might have some resemblence to a reasonably prudent person. This change of legal
standard has been concomitant with an increased knowledge
75 W.
71

7

PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).

Id. at 190.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
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in technologyJ8 Likewise, as the knowledge of the pilot's judgment process increases, the law regarding the duty of a reasonable person and defense strategies in tort cases will
change. Regarding possible changes in the standard of care, if
the concepts that most accidents are not caused by a singular
event and that poor judgment accidents result from a poor
judgment chain are accepted, the factors of proximate causes
of accidents may be expanded.
A re-examination of the Deal accident may serve to demonstrate this point.7 9 In that case, the surgeon-pilot was under
time pressure to arrive at his destination because he had a
clinic to visit and was already committed time-wise to a decision to fly instead of drive.80 That pilot had little actual
weather experience, but decided to file an instrument flight
plan through an area of known icing conditions with no deicing or anti-icing equipment, although more experienced pilots with such equipment refused to fly that day. 1 Because of
an earlier report of adverse weather, he followed advice to
wait a few minutes until the later report was available. Although the later report indicated worsening weather, he decided to make the flight. In all likelihood, the pilot believed
that planning the flight at the higher altitude to avoid the reported icing would cause further delay, and would be inconvenient because the destination airport was so close.
While enroute, the pilot encountered icing conditions.82 He
requested and received a clearance for a higher altitude.When
he reached the higher altitude, he reported that the ice was
76 See, e.g., Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc., 108 N.W.2d 428 (Minn.
1961), aff'd on re-appeal, 116 N.W.2d 266 (Minn. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 953
(1963) (recognizing that the act of flying has been brought out of a state where aircraft generally do not meet with disaster in the absence of some act of negligence);
Crist v. Civil Air Patrol, 278 N.Y.S.2d 430, 433-34 (Sup. Ct. 1967) ("[tlechnological
advances and development, and the experiences of the last two decades have dissipated the universal early fears that flying was an ultrahazardous occupation"); Baldwin, Liability for Accidents in Aerial Navigation, 9 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1910).
79 See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.

80 Deal v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 255
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).
11 Id. at 634.

" Id. at 635.
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beginning to break up. Instead of remaining at the higher altitude until the ice dissipated from the aircraft, the pilot requested to descend back into the area of known icing conditions to land at his destination airport rather than to turn
back or go to an alternate airport. The pilot executed an instrument approach, but in a cross wind he overshot the base
leg of the traffic pattern. Rather than execute a missed approach, he banked the aircraft too steeply to correct the overshoot, stalled, and crashed."8 The court found that the crash
was caused by the overbank, aggravated by a further loss of
84
lift due to the ice buildup.
Clearly, the pilot committed an act of poor judgment, but in
the judgment chain concept the final act, the overbanking of
the aircraft, was not the only cause of the accident. The first
error in judgment was a decision to fly instead of drive. The
pilot let his desire to arrive at this destination on time take
precedence over his concern for a safe flight. The pilot either
overestimated his abilities or felt that he was impervious to
poor decisions. Most courts would consider the earlier acts as
being too remotely connected with the more direct cause of
the crash, the pilot's negligence in banking too steeply. If the
pilot, however, as part of his training curriculum, knew how to
recognize the poor judgment chain and the need to break it as
early as possible, then an earlier act might be considered as
much of a proximate cause as banking the aircraft too steeply.
To carry this concept further, assume that the pilot knew
he had an expired medical certificate.88 Most courts would not
regard the fact as relevant without a showing that the expired
medical certificate was connected with the accident. If the pilot, however, was charged with the knowledge that proceeding
with the flight without the proper certificate may be the first
link in a poor judgment chain and the pilot was taught to
break that chain before it led to other decisions, then the pill Id.

at 635-36.
Id.
68 14 C.F.R. § 61.103(c) (1982) requires the pilot to hold at least a current thirdclass medical certificate, the requirements for which are contained in 14 C.F.R. §
67.17 (1982). A third-class certificate is valid for two years. Id.
4
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lot's failure to react in accordance with this knowledge might
be admissible evidence on a proximate cause of the accident.
Reviewing the Deal accident with reference to the hazardous thought patterns identified in the EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY, 8 6
at least two hazardous thought patterns are indicated. The pilot's insistence to change the filed altitude from seven thousand to five thousand feet, made as a retort to the FSS specialist's advice that "seven would probably be better," may be
indicative of "anti-authority" thinking.8 7 This conduct may
also be indicative of symptoms of "invulnerability." Curiously,
the FSS specialist stated that this pilot was known to act contrary to advice.8" This fact, which may have been probative as
to the reputation of the pilot, was not introduced because it
seemed too remotely connected with the cause of this particular accident. If the pilot was trained to recognize and correct
hazardous thought patterns, however, this type of evidence,
particularly along with the judgment chain concept, may be
probative on the issue of an expanded duty of care.
An analysis of crew behavior in the crash of Eastern Airlines flight 212 near Charlotte, North Carolina, on September
11, 1974, 89 may reveal another hazardous thought pattern-"external control." For nearly the entire flight, the crew
complained of problems caused by others; for example, the
Arabs, the Swiss, the Blacks, and other external factors.90 As a
result, the crew failed to complete their landing checklist and
failed to heed their instruments which resulted in the crew
literally flying the airplane into the ground. In the lawsuits
that followed, Eastern Airlines and its insurers alleged that
the air traffic controllers should have prevented the accident
by monitoring the descent of the aircraft on the radar in order
to notify the crew that the aircraft was flying too low.9' HopSee supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
6 413 F. Supp. at 635.
'a This information was learned by the author during witness briefings in preparation for the trial.
s9 NTSB ACCIDENT REP. No. AAR-75-9 (May 23, 1975).

" A transcript of the cockpit voice recorder tape is contained in the NTSB Accident Report. Id. at appendix E.
" See Arnold v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 16 Av. Cas. 17,592 (W.D.N.C. 1980), afl'd,
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ing to establish evidence showing a hazardous thought pattern, the government began its opening statement in the case
with the submission that "[t]his was a situation where supposedly professional airline pilots flew their airplane into the
ground while talking about what was wrong with everyone
else,"' 2 which is evidence of the classic hazardous thought pattern of "external control" categorized in the EMBRY-RIDDLE
STUDY.

The court found that there existed an attitude of complacency not only in the cockpit of the aircraft, but also in the
company as a whole."3 The evidence suggested that a hazardous thought pattern can be exhibited not only by a single person but also by a chain of people. In this case the pattern
extended from the crew to supervisory personnel within the
airline company. Thus, in the judgment chain concept, proximate causes of accidents can be extended to relate to actions
on the part of many others in addition to pilots.
Additionally, as the development of methodologies increases, an individual pilot will be able to perform individual
behavioral profiles for self-study. As the ability to be selfaware of our thought processes increases, it is safe to assume
that a duty to be self-aware will also increase. Thus far, the
courts have not been reluctant to recognize that pilots have a
duty to know not only the capability and limitations of their
aircraft, but also their own capacity.' 4 In fact, the pilot's duty
has been further specified as a duty to be aware of one's own
inexperience. 5 The EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY stated that "[t]he
pilot must consider all the facts which have, or should have,
681 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1982).
92 The defense of the air traffic controllers and the United States was tried by this
author. The opening statement appears only in the trial transcript.
" 16 Av. Cas. at 17,592.
See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., July 31, 1973, 412 F. Supp.
959 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd sub noma,Delta Airlines v. United States, 561 F.2d 381 (1st
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). See also Messick v. United States, 14
Av. Cas. 17,290 (S.D.W.Va. 1976).
" Bandy v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 13, 22 (W.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d
935 (6th Cir. 1980) (involving a flight into adverse weather by a pilot without sufficient experience).
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an influence upon his or her decision-making process."96 The
extent to which a pilot may be held responsible for knowing
his or her judgment capabilities or behavioral traits under various situations will depend, of course, on advances in this
field.
There may be increased responsibilities attending flight instruction as the study of human behavior develops. In the
field of education, it has been held that a training institution
may be liable for the negligent acts of the student which are
attributable to a lack of or improper training."7 The FAA not
only attempts to educate flight instructors on some of the
basics of human behavior, and the recognition and correction
of hazardous patterns in the students, but the FAA also holds
the flight instructors responsible, to some extent, for meeting
a minimum standard of knowledge of human behavior as part
of their certification requirements." Whether liability will attach to deficiencies in flight instructions, particularly relating
to judgment training, is a question which remains open. Indeed, it may be a future development in the law.
New advances in evaluation and training of attitude and
judgment may bring about different approaches regarding defense strategies. As an example, a study entitled An Analysis
of Aircrew ProceduralCompliance" suggests that information
which may be considered important to one pilot or crew may
be irrelevant to another pilot's judgment depending upon the
situation to be faced. The study explains that a seasoned crew
faced with an emergency, for example, may regard information as to the nearest airport to be the most critical, while a
new pilot may want to know more about what help he can get
from the ground, such as the availability of surveillance ap" EMBRY-RIDDLE STUDY, SUPRA note 51, at 3-4.
'7 See, e.g., Rodiguez v. Brunswick Corp., 364 F.2d 282 (3rd Cir. 1966) (holding a
training institution liable for the negligent act which a student learned either by example or tacit permission). See also Stehn v. Bernarr McFadden Found., Inc., 434
F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1970).
96 14 C.F.R §§ 61.183(d), 61.185 (1982).
'9 Schofield & Griffin, An Analysis of Aircrew Procedural Compliance, in FIRST
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY, TECH.

REP. No. APL-1-81, at

134-38 (1981) (sponsored by NASA American Research Center and the Association of
American Psychologists, at Ohio State University, April 21-22, 1981).
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proaches and direction finding capability. 00 As a possible application to cases wherein it is charged that inadequate
weather or other information dissemination or lack of certain
warnings caused the accidents, it may be shown that while the
subject pilots did not receive the entire quantity of available
information, they did receive sufficient qualitative information
to be able to make safe decisions. It may become possible to
obtain a profile of a pilot or crew based upon their actions in
previous situations to project how they would have acted if
they had received the missing information or warning. Such a
projection may demonstrate that the missing information or
warning, if received, would not have resulted in an alternate
decision, which is evidence on the issue of proximate cause.
The information gathered from developments in the evaluation and modification of the judgment process in aviation may
well be applicable to the evaluation and methodology used in
briefing and examination of witnesses at trial. Visiting the
Deal accident once again, a comparison between two opposing
pilot expert witnesses reveals such applicability of the study
of behavioral traits and hazardous thought processes. The
plaintiff's expert, with a background as a Navy fighter pilot,
testified essentially that he was qualified and would not have
hesitated in commencing the subject flight in the weather conditions as in which surgeon-pilot flew-the "macho" approach. On the other hand, the expert witness for the defense,
a pilot who had all pilot ratings and 50,000 hours of flight experience in nearly every type of civil aircraft beginning from
the early twenties, in response to a challenge of his expertise,
was asked to admit that despite all his credentials he did not
have sufficient qualifications and experience to have commenced such a flight under these same conditions. He admitted that he did not. Fortunately for the defense, the expert
had no need to prove himself, thus, the challenge literally
backfired. The plaintiff's witness, somewhat identified with
the plaintiff's decedent pilot, became cast as a person who
took chances in comparison to a person who was obviously
"

Id. at 138.
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more experienced and qualified and willing to recognize the
limitations of his abilities. This example demonstrates how
important it is for an attorney to be able to assess behavioral
traits and understand modification techniques in briefing and
examination of witnesses and in planning trial strategy generally. Thus, the subject of aviation psychology, particularly the
study of pilot judgment, in many ways can be fruitful for the
lawyer as it is for the pilot. It can win lawsuits as well as prevent accidents.
CONCLUSION

The study and efforts to achieve positive modification of pilot judgment and behavior are beginning to take place to a
signifigant extent in accident investigations, the field of aviation psychology, and in litigation. Because these advances will
bring with them new concepts in tort law that will affect the
evolution of the standard of care and the elements of proximate cause in litigation, attorneys should keep abreast of new
developments in this subject. What is more important than its
potential influence in the courts, is that the development in
this area will enhance pilot training and education and thus
minimize the number of pilot error accidents.

